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The integration of the citizens of the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) into the pension system of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is 
a unique case study in which an expanding welfare state may weaken the 
nation-building process. 
The welfare state is a dimension of politics in which a direct benefit for 
‘the people’ can be seen. Therefore, it is often assumed that the 
identification with the state gets stronger if the welfare state is expanded. 
This paper tries to show that the integration of East Germany in the 
German pension system resulted in a weakening of the identification with 
the nation, although the welfare state was expanded. German unification is 
also a test-case for the causal link between welfare state and regionalism. 
The two Germanys were separate nation-states for more than four decades 
and members of two different political systems. However, Germany is no 
multinational state in the classic sense, the claim to represent one nation is 
challenged by the sub-national ideas of East and West Germany. There is of 
course no ethnic division between west and east, but there are strong 
differences in culture (ethics and religion), habits, and social structure. 
Therefore, nation-building has not been a process which had to be 
strengthened after the unification, but rather newly initiated. Since German 
unification it has often been argued that this process of nation-building is 
still incomplete. One example for the sub-nationalism can be found in the 
success of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) in the eastern part of 
Germany. If we assume that “for a national minority within the state, the 
development of state welfare contributed to reinforcing an identification 
with and loyalty to the national state […]”, we would expect a positive 
relation between the integration of East Germany into the German welfare 
system and a “sense of solidarity and mutual commitment among citizens 
throughout the state” (McEwen 2002: 1). It is the aim of this paper to show 
that at least the integration into the pension system resulted in the 
opposite. 
The German pension scheme is one of the most important pillars of the 
German welfare state. 25% of all social expenditures are allocated to the 
pension system. (See OECD 2003b) If there is a connection between the 
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identification with the state and the amount of welfare spending, we will 
find it here. 
The argumentation will proceed as follows: The German pension scheme 
is perhaps one of the most complex models of social insurance. Therefore it 
is necessary to outline its characteristics in short. The focus will be on the 
aims, means, and the performance of the pension system. On this basis it is 
possible to compare the West German pension system with the East 
German one. This is necessary, because the argument is based on the 
assumption, that the East German pension system was not transformed but 
totally replaced after unification. To show this the paper will focus on the 
unification of the pension systems by explaining its aims, means, and 
performance. This allows examining the effect of this unification on the 
nation-building process. On this basis, it will searched for answers to the 
question, why welfare state expansion does not necessarily lead to welfare 
state nationalism. Therefore the concept of welfare state nationalism will be 
reanalysed. 
 
The West German pension scheme 
Aims 
The aims of the German pension scheme are to organize an income for the 
working class that ensures a basic living standard beyond the working life, 
and in doing this, to follow the principle of causation, meaning the real 
amount of old-age-benefit depends on the former contributions and equality 
in rights more than on universal aims of equality in outcomes. This goes 
along with the preservation of status differentials; special status groups like 
civil servants are upheld. Another important aim is to fortify self-help in the 
welfare state system. In Germany this is reached through the principle of 
secondary liability; the welfare state is only responsible if no closer related 
institution – mainly the family – is able to bear the social costs. 1  
Not only old-age-benefits are the concern of the pension system. Beyond 
that, the German pension scheme bares, in many cases, costs that are 
necessary to reconstitute the labour force (e.g. regimens). The German 
state always mistrusted the ability of its working class to save enough of 
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their wage for their old age; therefore another aim is the emancipation of 
the old-age-benefits from private calculation.  
From the beginning of the pension scheme under Bismarck, but also 
later e.g. in times of Adenauer, a secondary idea of the pension system was 
to integrate the labour movement in the national context.  
Means 
The German pension scheme is a pay-as-you-go system. For those with a 
monthly income less than 4,500€, the pension scheme is compulsory. It is 
possible for people with an income beyond 4,500€ to join the statutory 
pension scheme, but the normal case is that private insurance companies 
can provide better services. 
The pensions which are actually paid are financed through the social 
security deduction of those actually working. These contributions are 
approximately 20% of the wage resulting in claims.2  Though the pension 
scheme is officially separated from the national budget, the state has the 
possibility to supplement the pension scheme out of taxes (s. Bundestag 
2001, 8-22) and does so especially to bear the costs beyond old-age-
benefits. 
Beyond the official pension scheme, there are private and operational 
insurance schemes but they are only a supplement. “The accent on 
compulsory social insurance, complemented with more or less ad hoc 
residual schemes for strata without a ‘normal’ employment relationship, has 
meant that purely private market provision of welfare remains marginal.” 
(Esping-Andersen 1999, 83).  
Performance 
Contrary to a funded-pension scheme, the amount of the pensions is not 
entirely the result of former payments. Pensions’ calculations are based on 
different factors: taking into consideration the claims one has gathered 
during a working lifetime, the difference of the workers’ age to the official 
retirement age, and the so called actual value of pensions, which is set by 
government in a way that a person who has been working for 45 years for 
an average salary obtains a pension that allows him approximately 70% of 
his former living standard (s. Bundestag 2001b, 14). Both, the principles of 
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causation and of secondary liability are implemented in this pension 
scheme. The first, because the actual amount of old-age-benefits depend 
on the former salary and duration of the personal working life; the second, 
because old-age-benefits only result from the claims one has gathered 
during work. So women in particular must rely on the family. “The pension 
for a workingman was regarded as compensation for the former wage, while 
the widow’s pension resulted from the claim of maintenance from her 
husband by the economically non-active woman.”3  (Frerich 1996, 166) 
Another aspect of welfare state performance is to be considered: “The 
welfare state may provide services and income security, but it is also, and 
always has been, a system of social stratification.” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
55) No doubt, the German pension scheme does nothing else; 20% of the 
wages are used to pay the old-age-benefits, a method which is called the 
“contract of generations” 4. In this way redistribution is organised by the 
state within the working class, just because you are only participating in 
the pension scheme if your income is low enough. (Decker/Hecker 2002, 
118) And even within this class, status divisions are upheld by the pension 
scheme, too, because it is divided in several sub-schemes, for example for 
blue- and white-collar workers, civil servants, or miners. 
Taking into consideration the above mentioned aims, means, and the 
performance of the German pension system, one may refer to Esping-
Andersen’s notion of “conservative regime clusters”. As Esping-Andersen 
points out, the German pension scheme is an example of a “conservative 
welfare regime” (s. Esping-Andersen 1999: 82-85; Esping-Andersen 1990: 
25-32) with an “accent on compulsory social insurance, complemented with 
more or less ad hoc residual schemes for strata without a ‘normal’ 
employment relationship” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 82) and therefore de-
commodification focused on the “bread-winner”, a corporatist status 
division favouring civil servants, and of little relevance to a market based 
private pension scheme. 
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The pension system of the former GDR 
Aims 
In contrast to the pension system of the FRG, the main aim in the GDR was 
to ensure an overall equal living standard after working life without much 
regard to former salaries. Universalism preponderates over the principle of 
causation. Because of the state granted right to work, the pension scheme 
did not need to be aware of old people with long periods of unemployment 
in their working life. This “fusion of welfare and work” (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 28) meant on the other hand that the pension scheme should 
prevent people from retiring before the official retirement age (65 years). 
The living standard of the elders should be independent from every other 
institution but the state, to guarantee universalism.  
Between the working class and the middle class there should hardly be 
any difference in old-age-benefits. Concerning a small elite (intellectual 
elite, high members of the military and the police), the pension scheme 
should nevertheless provide a conservation of status differentiation.5  
Because of these aims, it is possible to speak of a “social democratic 
welfare state regime” in the sense of Esping-Andersen.6  
Means 
„Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the social democratic regime is 
its fusion of welfare and work. It is at once genuinely committed to a full-
employment guarantee, and entirely dependent on its attainment” (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 28). So, the main aim of the East German pension system 
was the guarantee of a right to work. 
As with the West German pension scheme, the GDR’s was also a pay-as-
you-go system. There were two compulsory social insurances; one for blue- 
and white-collar workers (Sozialpflichtversicherung I, SVI) and one for self-
employed persons and members of co-operatives (Sozialpflichtversicherung 
II, SVII). The SVI contained 90% of the insurants. (See LVA 2000, 4). 
Compulsory insurance was an income up to only 600GDR-Mark. Since 1971 
there was the possibility to make a voluntary additional insurance 
(Freiwillige Zusatzrentenversicherung FZR) for income between 600Mark 
and 1200Mark. The contributions to the social insurance were 
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approximately 20% of the net salary (both, in SVI and FRZ). In the period 
from 1947 to 1980 the average salary doubled, so this additional insurance 
was not only necessary to preserve the standard of living, but also 
affordable for everyone. (See Steffen 2002, 37)  
The difference between the income and expenditure of the pension 
scheme was compensated by government subsidies. In 1988 48% of old-
age benefits were financed that way. 
Performance 
Although there is a certain affinity between the two German pension 
systems – both are compulsory pay-as-you-go systems – different aims 
lead to different outcomes. The main aim of the pension system in the GDR 
was to secure a basic standard of living, and therefore the most important 
part of the pension was independent of payments. “The pension scheme in 
the social insurance system of the GDR did not establish a relation between 
wage or contribution and pension; old-age benefits were composed of a 
fixed amount and state controlled increase factors.”7  (Steffen 2002, 37) 
For every year in which the full amount of 600Mark was secured, the 
monthly pension from the SVI was 6Mark. So, after 50 years of work the 
old-age pension was 300Mark. This pension was supplemented by 2.5% of 
the secured amount in the FRZ. In addition there was a guaranteed 
minimum pension which was calculated only on the basis of a lifetime of 
labour without regard to contributions. “The minimum pension after 45 
years was 470GDR-Mark a month; after 15 years of work, the minimum 
pension was already 330GDR-Mark, so there was hardly any diversification 
of old-age benefits and as good as no regard to contributions.”  (CDU 
2002)8 Even more significant is the comparison of the minimum pension 
after 45 years of work (470Mark) to the benefits from the SVI for the same 
period with full contributions, which would be 480Mark.  
In addition to old-age pensions, widow’s pensions and disability pensions 
were paid, but they were aimed to keep the insurants in work as long as 
possible (s. LVA 2000:3). 
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The integration of East Germany in the German pension 
scheme 
Aims 
During the interim period between May 1990 and October 1990, the GDR 
had to put forward an equalisation of the pension scheme, on the legal 
basis of the state treaty (Staatsvertrag) of May, 18th 1990.9 The treaty 
described the establishment of a relation between wage and contributions, 
and the pensions as a core element. (Steffen 2002, 38) 10  On the one hand, 
the aim was to replace all pensions in the GDR by pensions newly 
calculated according to the West German pension system, but on the other 
hand, this was not intended to lead to a basal reform of the system, 
therefore it had to be more or less neutral to costs.  
Means 
“Because of the pay-as-you-go system, the integration of the territory of 
the former GDR was possible without the transformation of the whole 
welfare system. No other pension scheme could have mastered such a 
challenge for welfare politics in the way the pay-as-you-go system did. Had 
it been a funded-pension scheme, the social union would have had no 
chance.” (Ruland 2001, 3)11  A funded-pension scheme would have faced 
the problem of integrating people who had not created any funds. Because 
of the pay-as-you-go character of the pension scheme, not only the 
pensioners were integrated, but also new workers paying for them. 
The integration of the GDR in the West German pension system has been 
a very complex process especially in terms of law. Until 1991 the pension 
law of the GDR remained in force, including the factors for equalisation of 
1990. In the period from 1991 to 1996 the pension law was reformed 
eleven times.12  Basically, the GDR-pensions were recalculated on the basis 
of a standard pension resulting from a fictive model of a working-life similar 
to the one used in West Germany to calculate the “actual value of pension”. 
This model of a lifetime of labour is called the “Eckrentner” and is based on 
an assumed working life of 45 years of continuous labour with an average 
salary. For the GDR-pensions this meant, that someone, who had been 
working for 45 years and had also paid the full contributions to the SVI and 
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to the FRZ, should gain the same pension as the West German 
“Eckrentner”. (s. Steffen 2002, 37) But this model was challenged by a 
problem concerning the relation of expenditure and contributions of the 
pension system: Because of the state guaranteed right to work, nearly 
everyone in the GDR would gain the full average pension. At the same time 
it was obvious that many people in the GDR would become unemployed 
after the right-to-work was dropped and therefore would not pay any 
contributions to the pension scheme. In addition, the wages in East 
Germany have been lower than in West Germany (and still are). 20% of 
wage as contribution to the pension scheme therefore results in less 
resources for the pension scheme. Their were two reactions to this 
problem: 1) For claims resulting from the time of the GDR, the standard 
pension is calculated only from twenty years of contribution (instead of 45); 
and 2) for the territory of the former GDR a separate “actual value of 
pensions” is fixed,13  considering the relation between the net salaries in 
East and West Germany, and therefore being on a minor level. 
Performance 
As shown above, the pension systems in the GDR and the FRG belonged to 
different types of welfare state regime clusters. The two systems were not 
combined or transformed into something new but the integration of the 
GDR in the German pension system was an expansion of the latter; spatial 
- concerning territory and people –, and also, as will be shown, in quantity.  
This method of expanding the West German pension system towards the 
former GDR resulted in very different outcomes. Because of the lower 
“actual value of pensions” in East Germany the standard pension of an 
“Eckrentner” is on a lower level than in West Germany (see figure 1). 
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figure 1 
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Source: Bundestag 2001b, 51-52. 
At the same time, the real average old-age pension (not the standard 
pension of the “Eckrentner”) is higher in East than in West Germany. This is 
mainly the result of the continuity in working biographies in the former GDR 
with its right to work. Particularly female pensioners in East Germany do 
profit from this, because they have earned their own entitlements through 
their work, independent from their husbands. (See table 1) 
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table 1 
 Average Pension per month in DM 
 1998 1999 2000 
Men in West Germany 1827.61 1849.88 1856.00 
Men in East Germany 1864.19 1906.06 1912.40 
Men in Germany, total 1834.98 1861.19 1867.42 
Women in West Germany 1176.81 1199.16 1214.90 
Women in East Germany 1457.10 1497.26 1517.90 
Women in Germany, total 1238.16 1264.38 1281.07 
Men & Women in West 
Germany 1438.02 1462.45 1476.50 
Men & Women in East Germany 1610.35 1652.35 1669.00 
Men & Women in Germany, 
total 1474.55 1502.67 1517.19 
Source: Bundestag 2001b, 38-39. 
In 2000 the average level of pensions (men & women) in East Germany 
is still 113% of the level in the West. The average pension for women in 
East Germany is even 125% of western level. In 2001 only two thirds of the 
expenditure in East Germany were covered by the contributions.14 The 
lower contributions in East Germany and the higher level of average 
pensions are financed through a transfer within the pension scheme. In 
1996 this transfer reached the amount of 16,000 million DM (see Blüm 
1996).15 In 2001 24,209 million DM were transferred; this is nearly 7% of 
the total contributions to the pension scheme (see Bundestag 2001b, 56-
59). 
The average pension has also been far beyond the former average 
pension in the GDR (see above); however it is important to bear in mind 
that it is nearly impossible to compare the monetary value of the GDR-Mark 
with the DM, because of the totally different economic system. 
Another effect of the former commitment to universalism can be found in 
the stratification of the pensioners in East Germany. While there is a 
significant amount of pensions between 300DM and 600DM in the West, in 
the East this group is very small (see figure 2). It could therefore be 
argued that the aim to establish a relation between wage and contributions, 
and the pensions was not fulfilled. But while the pension system of the GDR 
hardly knew any diversification, the stratification of pensioners in East 
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Germany is now very similar to West Germany. Only in the segment of very 
low pensions is there this manifest difference. 
It is important to notice, that the different stratification and the higher 
average pension in East Germany still are caused by the pension system of 
the GDR. The lower level of the “actual value of pensions” in East Germany 
results from the integration into the German pension scheme. The first two 
effects will vanish in time when there are no more claims from the time of 
the former GDR. But the difference in the standard pension perpetuates 
itself, firstly because the claims for future pensions gained in East Germany 
are of lower value, secondly because the level of salaries is lower there and 
therefore less contributions are made, and thirdly because many young 
people move to West Germany to find jobs which are better paid and where 
their contributions to the pension scheme are more valuable.16 
figure 2 
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The aim of neutrality to costs was only reached in so far as the old West 
German pension system could carry on without major reforms,17 but the 
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expansion of the pension system towards East Germany caused a 
significant increase in expenditure on old-age cash benefits both, in total 
and as percentage of GDP, as can be seen in table 2. 
table 2 
Old-age-benefits / Germany total 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
In million 
DM 
184.527 192.182 200.727 210.393 219.778 231.161 269.876 295.572 313.233 331.081 356.427 
As a % of 
GDP 
8,74 8,64 8,73 8,70 8,60 8,47 9,19 9,37 9,68 9,75 10,12 
Source: OECD 2003a / OECD 2003b. 
It is of importance for the argument to notice that the integration of East 
Germany in the German Pension system went along with this increase in 
welfare spending. Even more extensive is the increase in social expenditure 
as a whole (see figure 3). While public social expenditure was nearly 
constant during the 1980s it suddenly increases in 1990. In comparison to 
France we see that this was not a European wide trend but must have had 
national causes.18  Kaufmann argues, that “the increase in 1990 above 
average is caused by the costs of unification. Without these, the FRG would 
have had an even further declining social expenditure compared with the 
national income.” (Kaufmann 2000, 184) 19 This might be thought too 
mono-causal, for there has been an increase in social expenditure in almost 
every OECD country (except Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands), but nowhere has it been as drastic as in Germany. (See 
OECD 2003b) 
Therefore, we can say that the expansion of the pension system towards 
the former GDR was also a quantitative expansion of the welfare state. 
figure 3 
Source: OECD 2003a / OECD 2003b. 
But this expansion affects different members of the nation in different 
ways: 1) Pensioners in East Germany are confronted with the fact that their 
claims are of less value than claims in West Germany. Nevertheless, they 
get a pension beyond the average West German level. Within the pension 
scheme there is a transfer from West to East, therefore 2) the pensioners in 
the West do not get the same pension and 3) the people in the West have 
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to pay more contributions than they would have to without the transfer. 
Never the less the pensions in West Germany increased (see figure 1) and 
the rate of contribution declined from 18.7% to 17.7% and stayed below 
19% until 1994. (see Arbeitnehmerkammer 2003) This may seem a 
paradox but one should bear in mind that the amount of old-age benefits is 
only related to the contributions actually made. But the most important fact 
is 4) the people now paying contributions in the East gain less claims than 
the same amount would result in, in the West; and this is not because of 
the legacy of the GDR but because of the peculiar logic of the integration. 
The German pension scheme and nation-building 
How do the above mentioned facts affect the process of nation-building? Of 
course this question is hard to answer because nation-building is obviously 
not only reached through a pension scheme.  
In theory one would expect that the expanding role of the welfare state 
goes hand in hand with a strengthening of the identification of the people 
with the nation. Therefore identification with sub-national groups or 
concepts is weakened. 
The development of state-wide political and class alliances, the 
importance of state-wide political debate and the national symbolism of 
welfare discourses and institutions may have contributed to generating a 
sense of community and identity to supersede, or at least sit alongside, 
sub-state national identities. The benefits and services offered by welfare 
states may also have contributed to reinforcing the subjective dimension 
of state nationhood, strengthening the rationale for the maintenance of 
the constitutional status quo among those who benefit from its services. 
At the same time, the welfare state may have weakened support for 
enhanced sub-state autonomy by heightening the risk that constitutional 
change might incur the loss of the economic and social security and 
services offered by the central state. (McEwen 2002, 6) 
In the case of West and East Germany, the expanding role of the welfare 
state did not function that way. Referring to a representative empirical 
study of the University of Bielefeld in 1993, there is a strong identification 
with the sub-national Group, especially in questions of welfare. People in 
East Germany think they do not profit enough from the welfare state, while 
people in West Germany often have the opinion that too much welfare state 
spending goes to East Germany. 78% of the people in East Germany agree 
upon the statement that “the Germans in the West in spite of their wealth 
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do not know how to share” (Westle 1993, 116). 67.8% in the West believe 
that “many people in East Germany want to live like the people in the West 
but do not want to work as hard as them” (Westle 1993, 100). 
So, there are great differences concerning the attitude towards the 
welfare state in East and West Germany. Only 19.2% of the people in East 
Germany think that the welfare state should remain the same. 79.4% 
believe it should be strengthened. In the West a majority of 59.9% is 
content with the status quo and only 33.6% would prefer an expanded role 
of the welfare state. (Westle 1993, 116) 
One could argue that nevertheless the welfare state and the pension 
system played a positive role in the nation-building process and that the 
results would have been worse without their positive effects. But this 
position must be rejected, as it can be shown that there are no significant 
differences in the Germans attitude towards topics of the nation which are 
not related to the welfare state. The attitude towards the nation is stronger 
if questions of welfare are not explicated (see table 3). E.g. 78.8% of the 
population in West Germany and 85.4% in East Germany think that 
unification was a success. 
table 3 
Attitude of in people in West and East Germany towards the nation (in %) 
How strong is the relation between you and… 
 your local 
community 
your federal 
state 
 the old FRG 
(West) / the old 
GDR (East) 
Germany as a 
whole 
 West East West East West East West East 
very strong 22,6 29,1 16,1 20,1 16,2 19,1 15 12,1 
strong 48,5 43,9 51,3 46,2 49 49,7 51,6 42,2 
not so strong 25,1 23,2 28 29 28,8 24,4 28,7 38,5 
weak 3,9 3,9 4,7 4,7 6 6,8 4,7 7,1 
Source: Westle 1993, 6-10. 
It seems as if the expansion of the German pension system did not lead 
to a strengthening of the attitude towards the nation as a whole. Instead it 
led to a stronger identification with the sub-national group for two reasons: 
1) The pay-as-you-go character of the pension scheme establishes a rivalry 
between different social groups (pensioners and contributors, East and 
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West). 2) The different levels of pension seem inequitable from the view of 
western contributors, who have to pay for the higher pension in the East, 
as well as from the East German’s perspective, gaining less benefits for the 
same contribution. It is important to remember, that from the subjective 
point of view every mentioned group is winning. The matter is about justice 
and not about personal benefits. 
The expansion of the German pension system is contradictory to what we 
would expect in another way. If political responsibility for welfare is shifted 
to the nation-state level, this should lead to a relative decline in regional 
parties. For the “development of systems of state welfare greatly enhanced 
the presence of the state in the everyday lives of its citizens. The expanded 
role of the state enhanced its visibility and presence in the eyes of its 
citizens. Moreover, it reinforced the centrality of state-wide 'national' 
political parties and leaders operating within state-wide 'national' 
institutional frameworks, and ensured that control of these institutions 
became the principal objective of political struggle. (McEwen 2002, 4) But 
after the unification, we find in the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) a 
strong regional party in the East. In the general elections of 1990, 1994, 
and 1998, the PDS managed to improve their results from 2.4% (1990), 
4.1% (1994) to 5.1% (1998). This is of course not very much but if we 
refer only to East Germany, the results look much different: 11.1% (1990), 
19.8% (1994), and 21.6% (1998).20  (see Eisel/Graf 2001, 1) The pension 
system is of great relevance to the success of the PDS. During the 1990s 
the Pension system is seen as the most important political topic right after 
unemployment. (see Brunner/Graf/Neu 2001, 13). In the view of the PDS, 
the pension system is one of the most important topics for its political 
work. (PDS 2003) 
Welfare state nationalism 
How can the case of the integration of the former GDR in the German 
pension system and its effect on the nation-building be explained? In the 
discussion about welfare state nationalism it is mostly agreed that the 
nation is an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991; Risse 2000, 5). There 
are two connotations of the notion community; the structure that results 
from similarities and connections between people (such as culture, 
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economy, politics, etc.) (Gesellschaft), and the positive identification of the 
individual with this community (Gemeinschaft). Both connotations of 
community together in matters of the political nation can be described as 
nationalism. In other words, nationalism is found where people feel they 
belong to the political community of the nation and identify in a positive 
way. This “national identity” has a subjective and a collective dimension. 
“Whereas the subjective dimension concerns the individual’s sense of 
belonging to and consent for the nation in question, the collective 
dimension contributes to defining the characteristics of the nation.” 
(McEwen 2002, 9) Welfare state nationalism therefore would be nationalism 
reached through or concerned with the welfare state. 
The German pension scheme is a structure that creates a real 
community (Gesellschaft) of the people in Germany. Everyone has to pay 
contributions to the same scheme and has the same rights concerning his 
pension. Political decisions are made by the same government for 
everybody, for in Germany the pension scheme is no matter for the federal 
states. In contrast to this is the fact that within the pension scheme the 
sub-national groups East and West still exist because of the different levels 
of the “actual value of pensions”. But the German pension scheme has 
other more obvious differentiations, e.g. between civil servants and miners 
(Esping-Andersen 1995, 2), and no one would claim that this results in sub-
nationalism.  
The more important question therefore is, why and under what 
conditions do people identify positively with the nation. Or in other words, 
why did the expansion of the German pension scheme not result in a 
strengthening of the Gemeinschaft. To identify in a positive way with the 
nation, the existence of the idea of this nation is a pre-condition on the 
subjective level. In the collective dimension, this idea – “the collective 
understandings of what it means to belong to a particular nation” (McEwen 
2002, 9) - may change, but some idea is still a pre-requisite. If we assume 
that welfare states belong to different clusters, it is logical to expect that 
these ideas, that give birth to nationalism, differ between the varying 
welfare state regime clusters. All types of welfare state have in common 
that they are aimed to modify the class structure by granting civil rights. 
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(Esping-Andersen 1990, 219; Marshall 1992, 40) But they do so in different 
ways. “In Britain, the sequence of achievement of citizenship rights, 
Marshall describes, does make sense. Civil rights were in some substantial 
part established prior to political rights and these, in turn, before economic 
rights. […] Thus in nineteenth-century Germany, Bismarck conceded 
various welfare rights to the working-class specifically in order to prevent 
the realization of the political rights Marshall describes.” (Giddens 1992, 
205) “Social democratic welfare state regimes” for example have the 
common interests of the working class (eventually combined with other 
classes) as a starting point. But in “conservative welfare states” like 
Germany social rights were granted by the state and did not result from a 
common interest among the working class but from the relation between 
bourgeois and citoyen. The bourgeois is following only his private interests, 
meaning the interests of an owner of private property or a commodity.21  
This means that he follows his interests in competition with everyone else. 
“Just because individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them 
does not coincide with their common interest (for the ‘general good’ is an 
illusory form of community life), the common interest is imposed as an 
interest ‘alien’ to them, and ‘independent’ of them, as itself in turn a 
particular ‘general’ interest; or else the individuals must encounter each 
other in this discord, as in democracy. (Marx 228) Because they want to 
follow their own interests, they need the state as an institution, separated 
from them, granting property rights and thereby allowing everyone to 
follow their own interests against all other interests. Everyone needs this 
institution for his particular interests: the worker needs the state to secure 
his property, the labour force; capitalists are in need of protection of their 
properties, and so are old-age pensioners relying on the state granted 
pensions.22  
So, because of their private interests the bourgeois must detach 
themselves from them.   
Civil society and the state are separated. Consequently the citizen of the 
state and the member of civil society are also separated. […] His existence 
as citizen is an existence lying outside the realm of his communal 
existences, and is hence purely individual. […] The separation of civil 
society and the political state appears necessarily to be a separation of 
the political citizen, the citizen of the state, from civil society, i.e., from 
his own actual, empirical reality; for as a state-idealist he is a being who 
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is completely other, distinct, different from and opposed to his own 
actuality. (Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right) 
So every bourgeois must be a citoyen as well. The identification with the 
nation – at least in a conservative welfare state regime – is not the result 
of the private bourgeois’ interest, but of the state-concerned citoyen’s 
interest.  
For man as a bourgeois [here, meaning, member of civil society, private 
life], "life in the state" is "only a semblance or a temporary exception to 
the essential and the rule". Of course, the bourgeois, like the Jew, 
remains only sophistically in the sphere of political life, just as the citoyen 
only sophistically remains a Jew or a bourgeois. But, this sophistry is not 
personal. It is the sophistry of the political state itself. The difference 
between the merchant and the citizen, between the day-labourer and the 
citizen, between the landowner and the citizen, between the merchant and 
the citizen, between the living individual and the citizen. (Marx, On the 
Jewish Question) 
The question therefore is not “Do I profit?” but “Does the nation profit?”. 
The gauge for this question is the “national interest” and not personal 
benefit. As Giddens has pointed out “dominant classes have much less 
difficulty representing their own policies as in ‘the national interest’ than do 
oppositional groups, since they have much more influence over the style 
and form of what can be discursively articulated” (Giddens 1992, 221). This 
tells us something about how the “national interest” comes about. The 
citizen then starts judging according to this “national interest”. As regards 
welfare state nationalism and our particular case, in a conservative welfare 
state, not based on the idea of shared interests among a special class 
coalition but on the separation of bourgeois and citoyen, the citizen 
compares the welfare politics to what he considers to be of national 
interest. If both do match, he identifies positively with the welfare politics 
and therefore, at the same time, a bit more with the state and the nation. 
The “national interest” concerning the pension system in Germany can be 
described in terms of the following factors:  
o Social security for elder members of the working class, reached 
through stratification within this class. 
o The principle of causation, therefore equality in rights not in 
outcomes.23  
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o A compulsory insurance system organizing solidarity amongst 
generations by force. 
Now we can explain why the expansion of the German pension system 
did not lead to a strengthening of the national identity. 1) The former 
citizens of the GDR may have had another understanding of the “national 
interest” concerning the pension system, based on the GDR tradition of 
universalism and “social democratic welfare state”. This is obviously part of 
the story but only explains the effect towards Eastern Germany. The more 
important reason is that the expansion of the German pension system is 
not consistent with the “national interest” as defined above. The different 
pension levels in East and West falls short behind the principle of causation 
and the transfer from West to East organizes solidarity amongst regions 
and not amongst generations. To strengthen national identity, the 
expansion of the pension scheme would have had to maintain the principle 
of causality and equality in rights and therefore either reduced pensions in 
the whole of Germany or raise the level of contributions. This would have 
had the effect that the group constellation had stayed stable: the 
generation at work pays for the elder, but there are no differentiations 
within the generations. 
Several questions arise from this position. Among them are the 
following: Firstly, under which conditions are welfare state regimes not a 
positive momentum in the process of nation building? Secondly, how do 
different welfare state regimes react under such conditions and how does 
welfare state nationalism function in other “worlds of welfare capitalism”? 
Thirdly, if the welfare state may weaken the national identity, might the 
rollback of the welfare state strengthen the national unity?  
  
Endnotes 
                                       
1 Frerich defines the principle of secondary liability based on the catholic tradition: 
„Zunächst solle sich der einzelne selbst helfen; und erst dann – wenn er dazu nicht 
mehr in der Lage sei – müsse ihm die Hilfe des Familienverbandes zuteil werden; 
erst danach dürften ersatzweise die Gemeinden, für diese wiederum danach 
ersatzweise das Land und schließlich der Gesamtstaat herangezogen werden. Diese 
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Rangordnung der Sozialkörper wurde nicht nur sachlich, sondern zugleich auch 
zeitlich interpretiert.“ (Frerich 1996, 31) 
2 There is a special distinctiveness in Germany concerning the social insurance 
contributions. Formally, half of the contributions are made by the employer and 
the other half by the employee, so it seems as if the employer not only pays the 
wage – of which the contributions of the employee are taken by the state – but 
also so called non-wage labour costs in the form of his half of the social insurance 
contributions. Economically speaking, these non-wage labour costs are nothing but 
a part of the total wage costs with which the employer has to calculate. It would 
make no difference, if the employer paid only the wage and the employee paid the 
whole contribution, as long as the total amount would be the same. (s. 
Decker/Hecker 2002, 119) 
3 „Die Rente an den Mann wurde als Lohnersatz betrachtet, während sich die 
Witwenrente aus dem Unterhaltsanspruch der nicht erwerbstätigen Frau gegenüber 
ihrem Mann ergab.“ (Frerich 1996, 166) 
4 The idea of a contract is an ideological notion in so far there has not been any 
negotiation or agreement between generations. For the concept of nation building 
the “Generationsvertrag” is important in the way that it expands the idea of the 
nation as a community beyond the borders of time in the past and the future. 
5 „Bestimmte Gruppen von Beschäftigten in besonderen Dienstverhältnissen, wie 
z.B. Angehörige der Volksarmee und der Volkspolizei, waren in eigenständigen 
Sonderversorgungssystemen versichert. Für Angehörige der sogenannten 
wissenschaftlichen, technischen, pädagogischen und medizinischen Intelligenz, für 
Mitarbeiter des Staatsapparats, der Parteien und der gesellschaftlichen 
Organisationen (z.B. Volkssolidarität) gab es zur Sozialpflichtversicherung rund 60 
Zusatzversorgungssysteme, die meistens eine Gesamtversorgung unter 
Anrechnung der Rente aus der Pflichtversicherung gewährten.“ (LVA 2000:2) 
6  Esping-Andersen’s differentiation of regime clusters is helpful as a theoretical 
framework, although his assumptions about class-mobilisation and his labels may 
be misleading. For critique see Ferrera 1996, Rhodes 1996, Ebbinghaus 1998 but 
also Esping-Andersen 1998. 
7 „Die Rentenversicherung in der Sozialpflichtversicherung der DDR kannte bis Juni 
1990 keine Lohn- und Beitragsbezogenheit der Rente; die Leistungen im Alter 
setzten sich zusammen aus einem Festbetrag und aus Steigerungsbeträgen.“ 
(Steffen 2002, 37) 
8 „Da die Mindestrente nach 45 und mehr Arbeitsjahren 470 DDR-Mark im Monat 
betrug und die Mindestrente bei bis zu 15 Arbeitsjahren schon bei 330 DDR-Mark 
lag, gab es fast keine Streuung der Sozialrenten und damit auch kaum leistungs- 
und beitragsabhängige Elemente“ (CDU 2002). 
9 „Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik leitet alle erforderlichen Maßnahmen ein, 
um ihr Rentenrecht an das auf dem Grundsatz der Lohn- und Beitragsbezogenheit 
beruhende Rentenversicherungsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
anzugleichen.“ (Art. 20, 1. Staatsvertrag) 
10 „Mit dem Staatsvertrag vom 18. Mai 1990 verpflichtete sich die DDR zu einer 
Angleichung ihrer Alterssicherungssysteme nach dem Vorbild der Bundesrepublik; 
als Kernelement der Angleichung legte der Staatsvertrag die Lohn- und 
Beitragsbezogenheit der Renten fest“ (Steffen 2002, 38). 
11 „Kein anderes Alterssicherungssystem hätte diese sozialpolitische 
Herausforderung so meistern können, wie es die Rentenversicherung mit ihrem 
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Umlageverfahren gekonnt hat. Wäre sie kapitalgedeckt gewesen, hätte die 
Sozialunion keine Chance gehabt.“ (Ruland 2001, 3) 
12 See Steffen 2002, 36-60 for details. 
13 „Bis zur Herstellung einheitlicher Einkommensverhältnisse im Gebiet der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland werden persönliche Entgeltpunkte (Ost) und ein 
aktueller Rentenwert (Ost) für die Ermittlung des Monatsbetrags der Rente aus 
Zeiten außerhalb der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ohne das Beitrittsgebiet 
gebildet, die an die Stelle der persönlichen Entgeltpunkte und des aktuellen 
Rentenwerts treten.“ (SGB 6, § 254b, 1. Rentenformel für den Monatsbetrag der 
Rente) 
14  The contributions in 2001 were 46,298 million DM while the expenditure for old-
age benefits was 76,911 million DM. (Bundestag 2001b, 57) 
15 „Unter dem Dach der Rentenversicherung werden von den alten Bundesländern 
16Mrd. DM in die neuen Bundesländer transferiert.“ (Blüm 1996) 
16 „Dass sich immer die Jungen, Ungebundenen, Mobilen und gut Ausgebildeten auf 
den Weg zu den Arbeitsplätzen begeben, führt schlussendlich dazu, dass sich die 
Transferleistungen im Konsumbereich für Arbeitslosigkeit und Rente strukturell viel 
stärker auf die neuen Bundesländer konzentrieren und damit das relative 
Verhältnis der Transfers den Subventionsanteil der östlichen Bundesländer hoch 
halten wird“ (Metzger 2001). 
17  Some do argue that the actual reforms of the German pension scheme are 
caused by the integration of the GDR (see Kaufmann 2000, 184-188), but the 
problem today is not to finance the pensions of the former GDR but to handle the 
high rate of unemployment in East and West Germany. So of course there is a 
connection between the actual reforms and the integration of the GDR but the 
latter is not the cause of the former. 
18 One could of course take other examples than France but there is no OECD 
country that shows a similar drastic shift. (See OECD 2003b) As immediate 
neighbour and as another important European country, the comparison to France 
appears to be self-evident. 
19 „Der überdurchschnittliche Anstieg ab 1990 ist durch die Vereinigungskosten 
bedingt. Ohne diese hätte die Bundesrepublik sogar weiterhin einen rückläufigen 
Anteil der Sozialausgaben am Volkseinkommen.“ (Kaufmann 2000, 184) 
20 „Die Tatsache, dass die PDS in Ostdeutschland deutlich besser, Union und SPD 
aber schlechter als in Westdeutschland bewertet werden, verdeutlicht noch einmal, 
wie gespalten die Bevölkerungsmeinung hinsichtlich des Parteiensystems ist.“ 
(Brunner/Graf/Neu 2001, 13) 
21 That all interests are those of owners of commodities is of course only true 
under the conditions of a capitalistic society, meaning for example that “for the 
conversion of his money into capital […] the owner of money must meet in the 
market with the free labourer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can 
dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he 
has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the 
realisation of his labour-power.” (Marx, Capital I, 169) 
22 This seperation does not mean that “civil society now becomes something 
distinct from the state in its origin and nature, to which the state owes its own 
existence and form.”  (Giddens 1992, 21) The separation is a logical one and does 
not deny that “civil society, as bürgerliche Gesellschaft, is in substantial part 
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created by the (modern) state or, put more accurately, that the two come into 
existence in conjunction with one another.” (Giddens 1992, 21) 
23 “Das Rentensystem ist in geradezu idealer Weise kognitiv und moralisch 
anspruchslos: es macht es jedem Teilnehmer leicht, die subjektive Gewissheit zu 
hegen, dass er bekommt, was ihm zusteht – ebenso wie es die Gewissheit nährt, 
dass niemand etwas bekommt, das ihm nicht zusteht” (Offe 1990, 185). 
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